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In R. v. Ryan, the Supreme Court of Canada overturned an acquittal 
premised on the defence of duress. Ms. Ryan, who by the time of the 
appeal was using her family name, Doucet, had been subjected to a 
“reign of terror” by her husband and feared that, after their separation, he 
would carry through on his long-standing threats to kill both her and their 
daughter. She attempted to hire someone to kill him before he could kill 
her. This became known to the police and an undercover officer met with 
Ms. Doucet under the pretence that he would kill her ex-husband. She 
was subsequently charged with counselling the commission of an offence 
not committed contrary to section 464(a) of the Criminal Code.
1
  
Ms. Doucet raised the defence of duress at her trial and was 
acquitted.
2
 The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown’s 
appeal.
3
 However, the Supreme Court of Canada reversed this appellate 
decision, holding that the defence of duress had no application to the 
facts at bar.
4
 Despite this ruling, a majority of the Court refused to order 
a new trial. They held that the ordeal Ms. Doucet had suffered and the 
change in position by the Crown from trial to appeal resulted in one of 
those clearest of cases in which a stay of proceedings was required.
5
  
                                                                                                                                  
*  Crown Counsel at the Crown Law Office - Criminal. The views expressed in this paper 
are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Ministry of the Attorney General for 
Ontario. I am grateful to Matthew Shumka, articling student for the Scarborough Crown Attorney’s 
Office, for his efforts in proofreading this paper. 
1  R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
2  R. v. Ryan, [2010] N.S.J. No. 154, 2010 NSSC 114 (N.S.S.C.) [hereinafter “Ryan 
NSSC”]. 
3  R. v. Ryan, [2011] N.S.J. No. 157, 2011 NSCA 30 (N.S.C.A.) [hereinafter “Ryan 
NSCA”]. 
4  R. v. Ryan, [2013] S.C.J. No. 3, 2013 SCC 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ryan SCC”]. 
5  Ryan SCC, id., at paras. 34-35. 
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The Supreme Court’s decision on the defence of duress afforded 
much-needed clarity to the law. In many respects, the decision was 
consistent with past jurisprudence and was logically coherent. However, 
Ryan left much to be desired with respect to those who may find 
themselves in the same situation as Ms. Doucet. The Court could have, 
with equal clarity and logic, upheld the decision of the Nova Scotia 
Court of Appeal. Ms. Doucet, on all the facts accepted by the trial judge, 
was in a truly terrible situation with no way out. Her actions were found, 
by both the Nova Scotia Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal, to be 
“morally involuntary” — the principle that underlies the defence of 
duress and is embedded in section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms
6
 as a principle of fundamental justice. It dictates that 
“morally involuntary” conduct should not be punished.
7
 That there was 
no legal “excuse” for Ms. Doucet’s morally involuntary actions was, to 
many, as will be discussed below, an affront to justice.  
For the next Ms. Doucet, the defence of duress is off the table. 
However, with the proclamation of the new self-defence provisions in the 
Criminal Code,
8
 a new interpretation of a traditional defence may afford 
further safeguards for vulnerable women in similar plights.
9
 In this paper, 
I consider both the procedural history and the underlying facts of 
Ryan, and offer a critical assessment of the Supreme Court’s decision.  
In Part II, I provide an overview of facts as found by the trial judge. I am 
                                                                                                                                  
6  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
7  See R. v. Perka, [1984] S.C.J. No. 40, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 232 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Perka”]; R. v. Hibbert, [1995] S.C.J. No. 63, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 973 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hibbert”]; 
R. v. Ruzic, [2001] S.C.J. No. 25, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 687 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ruzic”]. 
8  Criminal Code, s. 34 (in force March 11, 2013). 
9  The Ryan decision has been successfully applied to a situation in which a woman 
committed an offence to escape her husband’s physical violence. Ms. Mazerolle was charged with 
impaired driving. She testified that on the night in question, she and her husband both had been 
drinking. It was about 1:30 or 2:00 a.m. Her husband was very angry and was yelling insults at 
Ms. Mazerolle. He punched furniture and got more and more agitated. He became “enraged” and 
picked her up, pushed her and threw her to the floor. He got on top of her and squeezed her arms and 
shook her. She was about half of his weight. She somehow managed to get away and when running 
out the door she grabbed her car keys. There had been several past incidents in which he had used 
violence against her. During one incident, four months earlier, she called the police and her husband 
had been charged. She knew she had to escape. She got into her car and drove down a country road 
for about a minute. She pulled over and sat there for about 45 minutes thinking about where she 
could go, all the while worrying that he would come and find her. She decided she would drive to 
her parents’ house. It was on her way there that she was pulled over by the police. The trial judge 
unreservedly accepted her evidence and her explanations for her actions. Applying Ryan, the trial 
judge found that the Crown had failed to prove that the elements of the defence had not been 
established. R. v. Mazerolle, [2013] N.B.J. No. 413, 2013 NBPC 21 (N.B. Prov. Ct.). 
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careful to acknowledge the disputed status of “the facts” in this case, 
specifically as contained in academic criticism subsequent to the 
decision. In Part III, I present the state of the law with respect to duress 
as it was at the time of the Ryan decision. I consider its application at 
Ms. Ryan’s trial, and the ruling of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal 
affirming its use. In Part IV, I summarize the Supreme Court’s decision 
overturning the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal. I first consider the Court’s 
ruling that the defence was not applicable to the facts of the case at bar. 
I then turn to assess the state of the law following the Ryan decision, 
which I ultimately characterize as having obtained much needed clarity 
as a result of Ryan. In Part V, I turn to critique the Court’s decision. 
I argue that the Court took too restrictive an approach with respect to 
interpreting the law of duress, and failed to take account of both the 
realities of domestic violence and prevailing Charter values. In Part VI, 
my analysis takes on a more prospective nature. I consider the possibilities 
of the new self-defence provisions found in section 34, and argue that 
Ms. Doucet could have availed herself of them if they were in force at 
the time. I conclude by offering a normative declaration with respect to 
the potential of the newly enacted section 34, namely, that in order 
to preserve and develop the potential in the new self-defence provisions 
to help women like Ms. Doucet, counsel should ensure that section 34 is 
interpreted through the lens of Charter values and with a contextualized 
understanding of the realities of male violence against their intimate 
partners. 
II. OVERVIEW OF THE FACTS 
An overview of the facts of Ryan cannot be presented without 
acknowledging the fierce controversy surrounding “the facts”. Indeed, 
the factual summary in the facta of the appellant and respondent on 
appeal to the Supreme Court paint two very different pictures. The 
former presented Ms. Doucet as a woman who had no good reason for 
wanting Mr. Ryan killed and concocted the plan in order to get back at 
him for the difficulties encountered during the civil proceedings relating 
to their separation. The respondent spoke of years and years of abuse — 
physical, sexual and emotional — and of a woman who was still in the 
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grips of a reasonable and deeply held fear that her ex-partner would kill 
her and their young daughter.
10
  
Without doubt, aspects of the disputed facts had to be reconciled. 
As the Court of Appeal noted, “at first blush, one might be highly 
skeptical of Ms. Doucet’s assertion that she had no choice but to see her 
husband killed”.
11
 The Court noted that she was no longer with Mr. Ryan, 
she had a good job, a solid support network and custody of their 
daughter. The “last explicit threat” he made against her was uttered a 
couple of months before Ms. Doucet sought to hire the undercover 
officer.
12
 Further, it is understandable that some would question her 
assertion that she had no other avenues of escape. How can it be — with 
a secure job, supportive family and support networks that are supposed to 
be in place in Canada — that she had no other option?  
However, the Supreme Court of Canada, three judges of the Nova 
Scotia Court of Appeal, and, importantly, the trial judge, accepted Ms. 
Doucet’s account of the facts, that she had lived through a “reign of 
terror” and legitimately feared for her life. It is the facts as found by the 
presiding trial judge that are presented in this paper, and relied upon over 
the course of the analysis.
13
 As elaborated below, the facts included years 
of physical, sexual and emotional abuse; almost weekly threats of death, 
at times accompanied by a detailed plan of how she and her daughter 
would be killed and their bodies disposed of; and having a gun held 
against her head on four occasions. Further, there was corroboration in 
the form of testimony from the principal and vice-principal of the school 
where Ms. Doucet taught; a teacher she worked with; her counsellor; a 
man who experienced Mr. Ryan’s wrath during a road rage incident; and 
medical records that showed Mr. Ryan had a persistent issue with “anger 
management”. With this as the record, it is difficult to reconcile some of 
the considerable suspicion and opposition to her plight. It is also 
                                                                                                                                  
10  After the decision, Mr. Ryan put up a YouTube video criticizing the Court’s decision not 
to re-try the case. He called the decision “a farce and a disgrace to our Canadian judicial system”. 
See Christin Schmitz, “Court clarifies duress as a defence” The Lawyer’s Weekly. Mr. Ryan’s new 
spouse posted a message in a blog about the case stating that the allegations levelled against 
Mr. Ryan were all lies. 
11  Ryan NSCA, supra, note 3, at para. 5. 
12  Id. 
13  But see Joseph Hanna, “R. v. Ryan: Some Answers, Some Questions and a Curious 
Result” (April 2013) Ontario Bar Association – Criminal Justice Section [hereinafter “Hanna”] 
(where the author reviews the original trial transcripts and highlights such evidence as Ms. Doucet 
having only complained of verbal threats unaccompanied by physical violence on multiple 
occasions).  
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possible that the controversy over the facts is linked to a broader pattern 




Ms. Doucet and Mr. Ryan were married for about 15 years. Mr. Ryan 
served in the military, which took them to Ontario, Alberta and Nova 
Scotia.
15
 They had one child together, a daughter, born in 2000.
16
 Mr. Ryan 
was considerably larger than Ms. Doucet, six foot, three inches and 
230 pounds, compared to her five feet, three inches and 115 pounds.
17
  
Over the course of their relationship, Mr. Ryan physically, sexually 
and emotionally abused Ms. Doucet. In the first incident of violence, he 
yelled and swore at her, forced her against a wall, punched the wall and 
held his hand around her neck. He continued to pin her against the wall 
about once a week thereafter, sometimes leaving her with bruises.
18
 He 
also threw things at her, punched his fist against walls and frequently 
forced her to have sex.
19
 The threat of violence against her was often 
“imminent”.
20
 Many times, he threatened to kill or “destroy her”.
21
 Four 
incidents of threatening death were accompanied by holding a gun to 
Ms. Doucet’s head.
22
 At one point, he told Ms. Doucet that he would dig 
a six-foot deep trench in the back of their property to bury her and their 
daughter.
23
 He claimed that he would pile garbage on top so that no one 
would notice anything. During another incident he threatened to “burn 
the fucking house down” while she and their daughter were inside.
24
 
Mr. Ryan further threatened her with retaliation if she ever tried to leave 
him. His abusive behaviour intensified after their daughter was born.
25
 It 
got to the point that she was often afraid to leave the house. She was lost; 
she was isolated; she was without much hope.
26
 
In the summer of 2007, after one of his “flings” that lasted longer 
than usual, Ms. Doucet summoned the courage to ask for a divorce. 
                                                                                                                                  
14  For such discussion, see generally Elizabeth Sheehy, Defending Battered Women on 
Trial: Lessons from the Transcripts (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2014) [hereinafter “Sheehy”]. 
15  Ryan NSCA, supra, note 3, at para. 5. 
16  Id., at para. 26. 
17  Id., at para. 11. 
18  Id., at para. 17; Ryan NSSC, supra, note 2. 
19  Ryan NSCA, id., at paras. 15-16, 20. 
20  Id., at para. 33. 
21  Id., at para. 30. 
22  Id., at paras. 27, 34-35. Mr. Ryan also abused and killed family pets (id., at para. 36). 
23  Ryan NSCA, id., at para. 40.  
24  Ryan NSSC, supra, note 2, at para. 45; Ryan SCC, supra, note 4, at para. 7. 
25  Ryan NSCA, supra, note 3, at para. 27. 
26  Id., at paras. 31-32. 
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Mr. Ryan responded with violence and threats. Later that fall, after a 
dispute with him over her mother’s money, she became so fearful that 
she left their home to hide from him, living in different places.
27
 She 
continued to gravely fear Mr. Ryan and was convinced he would follow 
through on his threats to kill. She exhibited both physical and emotional 
effects of the abuse and her fear, as described in the testimony of the 
principals of the school in which she taught. It was around this time that 
Ms. Doucet started to think of having her husband killed.
28
 
Ms. Doucet said that she had called both the police and victim 
services many times for help. The police told her to “go away”, and that 
no assistance would be provided for “civil matters”.
29
 She also sought an 
810 peace bond for protection but was told by the Crown and victims’ 
services that a peace bond would not protect her.
30
  
In February 2008, Mr. Ryan showed up at her school, described as 
her “place of refuge”. This caused her considerable concern for her 
safety. Her anxiety escalated each time she saw him around. She felt that 
she had no way out, stating: 
There was no escape. Mr. Ryan knew me to a tee. He knew everything 
about me. He knew how I behaved. He knew my routine. I knew when 
he said something, he always acted upon it. I was trapped. I was 
trapped and I had no way out, none. Nobody wanted to help.
31
 
As the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal put it, “Ms. Ryan was in a very 
vulnerable state, she had lost a considerable amount of weight, was 
dissociated and despondent. She had an intense fear of Mr. Ryan, was 
feeling helpless, felt she had lost control and felt she was threatened with 
annihilation.”
32
 It was around this time that the police got wind of her 
attempt, and set up a sting operation. She was subsequently charged.
33
 
                                                                                                                                  
27  Id., at paras. 42-44. 
28  Id., at para. 45; Ryan SCC, supra, note 4, at para. 5. 
29  Ryan NSCA, id., at paras. 46-48. 
30  Id., at para. 50. But, see Hanna, supra, note 13 (in which the author asserts that the trial 
evidence only revealed a description of one event where she reported her husband’s threats to the 
police; this report led to her husband being charged although these charges were subsequently 
withdrawn by the Crown).  
31  Ryan NSCA, id., at para. 51. 
32  Id., at para. 129; Ryan NSSC, supra, note 2, at para. 73. 
33  Ryan NSCA, id., at para. 52.  
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III. THE LAW OF DURESS IN THE COURTS BELOW 
1.  The General State of Duress until Ryan  
Until Ryan, the law of duress was a “mess”.
34
 It is a defence both 
under the Criminal Code and the common law. Given the Ryan decision 
itself, and the focus of this paper, little will be said about how duress 
worked (or did not work) in the past. A few points, however, need to be 
considered in order to set the context for the Ryan decision and lay the 
foundation for the ensuing discussion.  
Section 17 of Criminal Code defines duress as follows: 
A person who commits an offence under compulsion by threats of 
immediate death or bodily harm from a person who is present when 
the offence is committed is excused for committing the offence if the 
person believes that the threats will be carried out and if the person is 
not a party to a conspiracy or association whereby the person is 
subject to compulsion, but this section does not apply where the 
offence that is committed is high treason or treason, murder, piracy, 
attempted murder, sexual assault, sexual assault with a weapon, 
threats to a third party or causing bodily harm, aggravated sexual 
assault, forcible abduction, hostage taking, robbery, assault with a 
weapon or causing bodily harm, aggravated assault, unlawfully 
causing bodily harm, arson or an offence under sections 280 to 283 
(abduction and detention of young persons).
35
 
The Supreme Court long ago held that this provision is meant to 
apply to principals of a crime who have allegedly committed a non-
enumerated offence.
36
 By contrast, parties to an alleged offence must 
resort to the common law defence of duress, which is preserved by virtue 
of section 8(3) of the Criminal Code.
37
 Further, some courts have 




                                                                                                                                  
34  David M. Paciocco, “No-one Wants to Be Eaten: The Logic and Experience of the Law 
of Necessity and Duress” (2010) 56 Crim. L.Q. 240. 
35  Supra, note 1. 
36  R. v. Paquette, [1976] S.C.J. No. 62, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 189 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Paquette”]. See also Hibbert, supra, note 7.  
37  See Paquette, id.  
38  In Ryan, the Supreme Court referenced the decision of R. v. Fraser, [2002] N.S.J. 
No. 400, 3 C.R. (6th) 308 (N.S. Prov. Ct.), which declared the s. 17 exclusion of robbery 
unconstitutional. 
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In addition, the Supreme Court in Ruzic determined that aspects of 
the statutory limitations built into section 17 to be unconstitutional — 
specifically the wording requiring that the threats in question be directed 
towards “immediate” bodily harm by a person who was “present” at the 
time the offence was committed. The Court reasoned that these 
limitations offended an accused’s section 7, Charter rights because an 
accused who was threatened with future harm and who had “no way out” 
would be denied a legitimate defence. The Court explained: 
The underinclusiveness of s. 17 infringes s. 7 of the Charter, because 
the immediacy and presence requirements exclude threats of future 
harm to the accused or to third parties. It risks jeopardizing the liberty 
and security interests protected by the Charter, in violation of the basic 
principles of fundamental justice. It has the potential of convicting 
persons who have not acted voluntarily.
39
 
However, to fill the gap left when the immediacy and presence 
requirements were struck out, the Ruzic court supplemented section 17 
with elements of the common law, namely, that there be: 
•  no safe avenue of escape; 
•  a close temporal connection between the act and the threat; and 
•  a proportionate response.  
This was the general state of the law when it was applied at Ms. Doucet’s 
trial. 
2. Duress at Ms. Doucet’s Trial and the Crown’s First Appeal 
At Ms. Doucet’s trial, the Crown took the position that the defence of 
duress had not been established on the facts. Justice Farrar of the Nova 
Scotia Supreme Court disagreed and acquitted Ms. Doucet. He 
determined that the defence was not only available to her, but that the 
Crown had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that each element 
of the defence had not been made out. The trial judge accepted her 
testimony about the years of abuse she said she suffered, without 
                                                                                                                                  
39  R. v. Ruzic, supra, note 7, at para. 90. Ms. Ruzic was from Serbia. She was charged with 
smuggling drugs into Canada. She pleaded that she had been ordered to bring the drugs in under threat of 
bodily harm against her mother. She did not think that she could realistically turn to the police for 
assistance. However, under the then stricter confines of s. 17, duress was unavailable because the person 
who threatened her was not “present” and the threat was one that would occur in the future.  
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qualification. He found that her fear of Mr. Ryan was justified. 
Concerning her evidence about Mr. Ryan, the trial judge said the 
following: “I have no difficulty in concluding that Mr. Ryan was a 
manipulative, controlling and abusive husband, that sought at every turn 
to control the actions of his wife …”.
40
 
In appealing Ms. Doucet’s acquittal, the Crown argued that the 
defence of duress could not apply to her situation. The Crown submitted, 
in essence, that her claim of duress was nothing more than “an 
inappropriate back-door plea of self-defence”. The Nova Scotia Court of 
Appeal unanimously upheld Ms. Doucet’s duress-based acquittal. In 
doing so, the Court thoughtfully and thoroughly considered the legal 
history of duress.  
In its determination that the law of duress could apply to the facts at 
hand, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal focused on whether Ms. Doucet’s 
conduct was “morally involuntary”. The Court was clearly concerned 
about Ms. Doucet’s plight, a plight where none of the self-defence 
provisions in force at the time applied.
41
 The Court recognized, however, 
that her situation did not easily “fit” within the parameters of the defence 
of duress. To apply duress to her circumstances would require the Court 
to take the defence of duress “where it has never gone before”.
42
 After 
acknowledging this, MacDonald C.J.N.S. asked: 
Yet if Ms. Doucet truly had “no way out,” would it be just to deny her a 
defence simply because her circumstances did not fit neatly into the 
                                                                                                                                  
40  Ryan NSSC, supra, note 2, at para. 56. 
41  Ryan NSCA, supra, note 3, at paras. 60-64. The appellate Court also questioned whether 
self-defence should apply, given that it is a justification-based defence and not just an excuse-based 
defence. The difference between the two was described this way in Perka, supra, note 7, at 246, 248-49:  
Criminal theory recognizes a distinction between “justifications” and 
“excuses”. A “justification” challenges the wrongfulness of an action which 
technically constitutes a crime. The police officer who shoots the hostage-taker, 
the innocent object of an assault who uses force to defend himself against his 
assailant, the Good Samaritan who commandeers a car and breaks the speed 
laws to rush an accident victim to the hospital, these are all actors whose actions 
we consider rightful, not wrongful. For such actions people are often praised, as 
motivated by some great or noble object. The concept of punishment often 
seems incompatible with the social approval bestowed on the doer. 
In contrast, an “excuse” concedes the wrongfulness of the action but 
asserts that the circumstances under which it was done are such that it ought not 
to be attributed to the actor. The perpetrator who is incapable, owing to a disease 
of the mind, of appreciating the nature and consequences of his acts, the person 
who labours under a mistake of fact, the drunkard, the sleepwalker: these are all 
actors of whose “criminal” actions we disapprove intensely, but whom, in 
appropriate circumstances, our law will not punish. 
42  Ryan NSCA, id., at para. 73.  
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traditional parameters of one of our enumerated defences. In other 
words, must the defence of duress be limited to those situations where 
the victim is a third party? If so, would there be a principled basis for 
such a prerequisite? To answer these questions, I harken back to 
Dickson, J. in Perka, where he invites us to concentrate on the rationale 
of such defences, which is to excuse involuntary conduct. 
Thus, my inquiry should focus less on who did what to whom in who’s 
presence and more on the accused’s predicament and whether or not 
her actions were truly involuntary. In other words, did Ms. Doucet have 
an avenue of escape short of the “crime” she committed? On this basis, 
should it matter that Ms. Doucet targeted her assailant as opposed to the 
conventional third party? One would think not, but yet a closer look at 
this defence is in order.
43
 
Further, the Court noted that in order to properly interpret the 
defence of duress, it must “fully understand the plight of battered spouses 
(most often women) ... having reacted to threats from their abusive 
partners”.
44
 It was with this understanding that the Court determined that 
the defence had to be “sufficiently flexible to, when appropriate, 
accommodate the dark reality of spousal abuse”.
45
  
After undertaking a review of duress, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal 
concluded that the defence was available to a woman who tries to hire 
someone to kill her abusive husband. In so doing, the Court commented: 
I return to the rationale for this defence — to excuse morally 
involuntary conduct. Viewed in this light, I can see no principled basis 
to justify a distinction between the aggressor as opposed to a third party 
being the targeted victim. After all, had Ms. Doucet attacked her 
husband directly, self-defence would represent a potential avenue of 
defence (based on Lavallee, supra). Therefore, it would be ironic 
indeed to see her denied a defence for an indirect attack.
46
 
IV. THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA 
1.  The Defence Does Not Apply to the Facts at Hand 
The main issue for the Supreme Court was whether the defence of 
duress was available to an accused person who tried to commit an 
                                                                                                                                  
43  Id., at paras. 74-75. 
44  Id., at para. 91.  
45  Id.  
46  Id., at para. 99.  
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offence against the threatening party. This contrasts with the paradigmatic 
example of duress whereby the accused commits an offence because he or 
she is under the duress of the threatening party to do so. The Crown, 
supported by the Ministry of the Attorney General for Ontario, took 
the position that duress had no applicability to Ms. Doucet’s situation. 
Ms. Doucet’s position was supported by the Criminal Lawyers’ 
Association (“CLA”), the Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies 
(“CAEFS”) and the Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund 
(“LEAF”).  
As we know, the Supreme Court found that the defence of duress is 
only available when a person commits an offence while under 
compulsion of a threat made for the purpose of compelling her to commit 
the very offence in question. In coming to its determination the Court 
injected much-needed clarity and harmonization of the law in this area.
47
  
The Court began its analysis of the issue with a look at its previous 
decision in Hibbert, wherein Lamer C.J.C. noted the similarities and 
dissimilarities between self-defence, as compared to duress and 
necessity. Referring to the former, the Chief Justice said that: 
... the victim of the otherwise criminal act at issue is himself or herself 
the originator of the threat that causes the actor to commit what would 
otherwise be an assault or culpable homicide. ... In this sense, he or she 
is the author of his or her own deserts....
48
 
Speaking of duress and necessity, the Chief Justice said that “the 
victims of the otherwise criminal act ... are third parties, who are not 
themselves responsible for the threats or circumstances of necessity that 
motivated the accused’s actions”.
49
  
A further distinction between self-defence and duress is that with 
self-defence it is the victim who attacks the accused, the motive for 
which is irrelevant. With duress, the threat is aimed at compelling 
criminal action. Accordingly, “self-defence is an attempt to stop the 
victim’s threats or assaults by meeting force with force; duress is 
succumbing to the threats by committing an offence”.
50
 
                                                                                                                                  
47  See Steve Coughlan, “The Rise and Fall of Duress: How Duress Changes Necessity 
Before Being Excluded by Self-Defence” (2013) 39 Queen’s L.J. 83 [hereinafter “Coughlan, ‘The 
Rise and Fall of Duress’”]. 
48  Hibbert, supra, note 7, at para. 50, cited in Ryan SCC, supra, note 4, at para. 18. 
49  Hibbert, id., at para. 50, cited in Ryan SCC, id., at para. 18. 
50  Ryan SCC, id., at para. 20. 
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These two distinctions, namely, the role of the victim and the 
compulsion to commit the offence in question, were part of what led the 
Supreme Court to determine that it was an inappropriate stretch to apply 
duress to the actions of Ms. Doucet. In addition, the Court noted two 
other important points that informed its reasoning and conclusion. First, 
Parliament codified the self-defence provisions and established what its 




The second important point underlying the Court’s decision was the 
distinct rationales for the defences. With a successful claim of duress, an 
accused is “excused” for his or her actions. The actions themselves, 
while excusable, are nonetheless seen as wrong. The defence is excused-
based because it rests on the premise that only voluntary behaviour 
should attract penal consequences.  
The rationale underlying duress is that of moral involuntariness, which 
was entrenched as a principle of fundamental justice in R. v. Ruzic, 
2001 SCC 24, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 687, at para. 47: “It is a principle of 
fundamental justice that only voluntary conduct — behaviour that is the 
product of a free will and controlled body, unhindered by external 
constraints — should attract the penalty and stigma of criminal 
liability.” It is upon this foundation that we build the defences of duress 
and necessity. As Lamer C.J. put it in Hibbert, the underlying concept 
of both defences is “normative involuntariness”, in other words, that 
there is “no legal way out”: para. 55. While the test to be met is not 
dictated by this generally stated rationale underlying the defence, its 
requirements are heavily influenced by it. As was discussed in Perka, 
defences built on the principle of moral involuntariness are classified as 
excuses. The law excuses those who, although morally blameworthy, 
acted in a morally involuntary manner. The act remains wrong, but the 
author of the offence will not be punished because it was committed in 
circumstances in which there was realistically no choice: Ruzic, at para. 
34; Perka, at p. 248. The principle of moral involuntariness is “[a] 
concessio[n] to human frailty” in the face of “agonising choice”: Ruzic, 
at para. 40; [other citation omitted]. The commission of the crime 
is “remorselessly compelled by normal human instincts”: Perka,  
at p. 249. As LeBel J. put it in Ruzic: “morally involuntary conduct is 
not always inherently blameless” (para. 41).
52
 
                                                                                                                                  
51  Id., at para. 22. 
52  Id., at para. 23.  
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With self-defence, the accused’s actions are justified. The actions 




This distinction carried with it two conclusions. First, defences based 
on justification should be, and are, more “readily available” than excuse-
based ones. It would be incongruous, the Court determined, if a person’s 
actions were not justified under the more readily available self-defence 
but were covered by the more circumscribed excuse of duress. To hold 
otherwise would result in incoherence in our criminal law.
54
  
Second, following up on an earlier point the Court made, because 
self-defence is entirely codified, courts cannot overstep their bounds and 
“use the flexibility of the common law to develop duress” in such a way 
that would intrude on the role of Parliament.  
Duress cannot be extended so as to apply when the accused meets force 
with force, or the threat of force with force in situations where self-
defence is unavailable. Duress is, and must remain, an applicable 
defence only in situations where the accused has been compelled to 
commit a specific offence under threats of death or bodily harm. This 
clearly limits the availability of the offence to particular factual 
circumstances. The common law elements of duress cannot be used to 




After its determination that duress was not available to Ms. Doucet, 
the Court then turned to the appropriate remedy. Eight of the nine 
justices found that a combination of factors resulted in an exceptional 
situation that warranted an exceptional remedy, a stay of proceedings.
56
 
The four factors identified by the Court were as follows:
57
 
(1) The law of duress was, at the time of her trial and appeal, unclear. 
(2) The Crown changed its position about the law between the trial and 
the appeal. As such, Ms. Doucet tried her case based on the Crown’s 
original position and she might have conducted her case differently 
                                                                                                                                  
53  Id., at paras. 23-25. 
54  Id., at paras. 27, 31. 
55  Id., at paras. 28-29, 32. It should be noted that the Supreme Court did not address 
whether self-defence was potentially available to Ms. Doucet (id., at para. 31).  
56  The usually defence-leaning Fish J. took exception to the stay and would have ordered a 
new trial. Id., at para. 90.  
57  Id., at paras. 34-35.  
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had the Crown taken the position it did on appeal at her trial. Those 
decisions may not be undone. 
(3) Mr. Ryan’s abuse had taken an “enormous toll” on Ms. Doucet — as 
had the five years of trial and appellate proceedings. 
(4) “[T]he disquieting fact” that it appears the authorities were much 
quicker to intervene to protect Mr. Ryan from harm than they were to 
protect Ms. Doucet. 
2.  Adding Clarity to Confusion 
As stated above, the Court took the opportunity this case offered to 
provide much-needed clarity to the law of duress. The Court stated that 
the defence of duress pursuant to section 17 and under the common law 




 First, there must be an explicit or implicit threat of present or future 
death or bodily harm. The threat to cause harm can be directed either 
at the accused or at a third party.  
 Second, the accused must reasonably believe that the threat will be 
carried out if they do not act as directed. 
 Third, there is no safe avenue of escape. The defence does not apply 
to persons who could have legally and safely removed themselves 
from the situation. This element is to be evaluated on a modified 
objective standard of the reasonable person similarly situated.
59
  
 Fourth, there must be a close temporal connection between the threat 
and the harm that is being threatened. The connection must cause the 
accused to lose their ability to act freely. The Court explained that 
there is some interplay between this element and the third. As the 
Ruzic Court had explained it, a threat that is “too far removed in time 
                                                                                                                                  
58  However, certain differences between the two remain, namely: s. 17 applies to principals 
and the common law defence to parties to an offence; and s. 17 lists a number of offences that are 
excluded from its reach. The Court recognized that these differences create an inconsistent result. 
Principals who commit one of the enumerated offences in s. 17 cannot rely on the defence of duress, 
whereas parties to those very same offences can. However, the Court was not prepared to grapple 
with that issue. Id., at paras. 83-84. 
59  Id., at paras. 47, 81. 
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... would cast doubt on the seriousness of the threat and, more 
particularly, on claims of an absence of a safe avenue of escape”.
60
  
 Fifth, there must be proportionality between the harm threatened and 
the harm inflicted by the accused. The harm caused by the accused 
must not be greater than the harm avoided. In other words, there 
must be a demonstrated “fortitude” or “resistance” to the threat. This 
element is also evaluated on a modified objective standard.
61
 
 Sixth, to avail themselves of this defence, an accused cannot be “a 
party to a conspiracy or association whereby the accused is subject to 
compulsion and actually knew that threats and coercion to commit an 




The Ryan Court explained that the elements of belief that the threat 
will be carried out, no safe escape and a close temporal connection must 
be analyzed “as a whole”. As the Court wrote, “the accused cannot 
reasonably believe that the threat would be carried out if there was a safe 
avenue of escape and no close temporal connection between the threat 
and the harm threatened”.
63
  
Furthermore, the particular elements that the Court added into 
section 17 when it struck out the immediacy and presence requirements 
in Ruzic “tempered” the straight subjective belief standard that the 
wording of section 17 required. In so doing, the interpretation of section 17 
was brought into line with the principle of moral involuntariness. To 
have one’s actions considered to be “morally involuntary” there must be 
certain factors present, such as no safe avenue of escape and a close 
temporal connection. The actions also must be in response to threats that 
“‘a person of reasonable firmness’ with the characteristics and in the 
situation of the defendant could not have been expected to resist”.
 64
 
The actions of the accused must further be proportionate to the threat 
in order to fall under the principle of moral involuntariness. 
Proportionality is described as being “inherent” in this principle and is 
evaluated, on a modified objective basis, with two things in mind: first, 
the difference between the harm threatened and the harm the accused 
                                                                                                                                  
60  Ryan SCC, id., at paras. 48-51, 81; Ruzic, supra, note 7, at para. 65. 
61  Ryan SCC, id., at paras. 54, 81. 
62  Id., at paras. 51, 81. 
63  Id., at para. 51. 
64  Id., at para. 52.  
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caused; and second, a “general moral judgment” about the accused’s 
behaviour. As Dickson J. explained in Perka: 
There must be some way of assuring proportionality. No rational 
criminal justice system, no matter how humane or liberal, could excuse the 
infliction of a greater harm to allow the actor to avert a lesser evil. ...  
... Determining this threshold is patently a matter of moral 
judgment about what we expect people to be able to resist in 
trying situations. A valuable aid in making that judgment is 
comparing the competing interests at stake and assessing the 
degree to which the actor inflicts harm beyond the benefit that 
accrues from his action.
65
 
V. ISSUES WITH THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION 
As noted above, the Court’s decision in Ryan provide much-needed 
clarity on the law of duress. For some, however, the decision was 
incredibly disappointing. It has been criticized for failing to reflect the 
realities of domestic violence and for not according with Charter values. 
As the interveners CAEFS and LEAF informed the Court, in Canada, a 
woman is killed by her former or current male domestic partner every 
six days. Most frequently, these homicides occur within two years of a 
separation and sometimes children (and other family members) are also 
killed.
66
 Many of the factors understood as risk factors for lethal violence 
were present in Ms. Doucet’s situation. Accordingly, the interveners 
argued, the Court was required to assess the case in recognition of the 
realities of women’s lives. After the decision, LEAF and CAEFS released 
a joint statement criticizing the decision for failing to “capture the 
diversity of human experience”. Others asserted that the Court cared more 
about conceptual stability than about the evolution of the common law.
67
 
This criticism stands in stark contrast to the reception advocates and 
some academics gave to the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal’s decision. 
Advocates for abused women applauded the decision. A Ms. Magazine 
                                                                                                                                  
65  Id., at paras. 54, 70-74, citing Perka, supra, note 7, at 252.  
66  Factum of the interveners, at para. 1, citing Statistics Canada, Juristat, Homicide in 
Canada, 2010 by T. Mahoney (Ottawa: StatCan, October 26, 2011), at 11-12; Statistics Canada, 
Family Violence in Canada: A Statistical Profile, 2011 (Ottawa: StatCan, 2011), at 37-38. 
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blog called it “a beacon of hope”.
68
 Professor Elizabeth Sheehy, an expert 




The Supreme Court could have followed the Nova Scotia Court of 
Appeal’s flexible and contextual interpretation of the defence. To do so 
would have been to recognize the grim reality faced by Ms. Doucet. She 
was “a person who commit[ed] an offence under compulsion by threats”. 
The threats were “temporally connected” and were from a person who 
she reasonably believed would carry out those threats. She believed she 
had “no other safe avenue of escape”. Her actions were seen by both 
courts below as proportional. Her actions satisfied the requirements of 
“morally involuntary”. She was not a party to a conspiracy or association 
and she was not charged with one of the excluded offences listed in the 
section. All of the six elements of the defence could have been met, and 
were recognized as having been met by both the Nova Scotia Supreme 
Court and the Court of Appeal.  
Arguably, adopting the interpretation of the provision in the courts 
below would not have intruded any further into Parliament’s role than it 
did in Ruzic. The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal did not base its decision 
on “filling in a gap” that the inapplicability of the old self-defence 
provisions created. The appellate court simply noted that self-defence 
could not have applied and then moved on to separately assess whether 
the defence of duress, as advanced, was available. 
The fact that duress had never “gone there before” also does not 
serve as compelling grounds against affirming the Court of Appeal’s 
decision. Many celebrated cases from the Supreme Court took the law in 
a new direction, with Lavallee and Ruzic being instructive examples. The 
defining characteristic of duress, as Professor Coughlan pointed out in 
his case comment on the Court of Appeal case, is the nature of the 
threats. Duress, he noted, could “with no reinterpretation be applicable 
where the target of the offence is the aggressor: ‘assist me in committing 
suicide or I will shoot you.’ for example”.
70
 It is disappointing that the 
Supreme Court showed such trepidation when faced with an individual 
whose actions were properly viewed as morally involuntary. The Court 
                                                                                                                                  
68  Maria Kohlman, “Canada Offers ‘Duress’ Defence for Battered Women” Ms. Magazine 
(April 14, 2011). 
69  Kirk Makin, “Nova Scotia court issues landmark decision for abused women” The Globe 
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had an opportunity to further the limits of the common law in a way 
consistent with the principles of fundamental justice, but declined to do 
so. Fortunately, the Court’s overly cautious deferential approach may not 
be the last word for women who find themselves in Ms. Doucet’s plight, 
and Parliament itself may have afforded the solution to this dilemma.  
VI. COULD THE NEXT MS. DOUCET AVAIL HERSELF OF THE NEW 
SELF-DEFENCE PROVISION? 
In March 2013, a new self-defence provision came into force, 
replacing the prior provisions contained in sections 34 to 37. These old 
provisions were complicated and often subject to academic and judicial 
criticism. Indeed, if duress was seen before as a “mess”, self-defence was 
an all-out disaster. The new provision contained in section 34 is 
essentially a reasonableness test: 
 34(1) A person is not guilty of an offence if 
(a)  they believe on reasonable grounds that force is being used against 
them or another person or that a threat of force is being made 
against them or another person; 
(b)  the act that constitutes the offence is committed for the purpose of 
defending or protecting themselves or the other person from that 
use or threat of force; and 
(c)  the act committed is reasonable in the circumstances. 
 (2) In determining whether the act committed is reasonable in the 
circumstances, the court shall consider the relevant circumstances of 
the person, the other parties and the act, including, but not limited to, 
the following factors: 
(a)  the nature of the force or threat; 
(b)  the extent to which the use of force was imminent and whether 
there were other means available to respond to the potential use of 
force; 
(c)  the person’s role in the incident; 
(d)  whether any party to the incident used or threatened to use a 
weapon; 
(e)  the size, age, gender and physical capabilities of the parties to the 
incident; 
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(f)  the nature, duration and history of any relationship between the 
parties to the incident, including any prior use or threat of force 
and the nature of that force or threat; 
(f.1) any history of interaction or communication between the parties to 
the incident; 
(g)  the nature and proportionality of the person’s response to the use 
or threat of force; and 
(h)  whether the act committed was in response to a use or threat of 
force that the person knew was lawful. 
 (3) Subsection (1) does not apply if the force is used or threatened 
by another person for the purpose of doing something that they are 
required or authorized by law to do in the administration or 
enforcement of the law, unless the person who commits the act that 
constitutes the offence believes on reasonable grounds that the other 
person is acting unlawfully. 
This new provision could apply to the next Ms. Doucet, as academic 
commentators have already noted. Section 34 may justify an accused 
committing any crime in defence of themselves or others if it is 
reasonable to do so.
71
 In thinking about the enumerated factors through 
the lens of Ms. Doucet’s situation, and the commentary surrounding 
Ryan, a number of points can be made.  
Many questioned the legitimacy of Ms. Doucet’s evidence because 
she had not previously disclosed the physical and sexual violence. It 
must be kept in mind, however, the instruction from R. v. Lavallee (and 
what advocates for abused women have been saying for years) that a 
“manifestation of this victimization is a reluctance to disclose to others 
the fact or extent of the beatings”.
72
 As with the doctrine of recent 
complaint in the context of sexual offences, the law must be careful not 
to impose artificial and discriminatory beliefs. While prior disclosure 
may prove corroborative, the lack thereof may signify nothing more than 
the reality that many women, for various reasons, do not disclose abuse.  
Further, there are many and various reasons why women do not 
report abuse. For Ms. Doucet, it was because she was afraid of the 
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consequences from Mr. Ryan and the lack thereof from the justice 
system:  
I was afraid. I was afraid because of what he would do if I ever refused. 
I just had to protect [their daughter]. I had to protect myself. You keep 
the peace. If you don’t disobey, you’re keeping the peace. You don’t 
know what to do. You feel helpless. You feel worthless. You don’t 
even feel like a human being anymore, but you know that you have to 
do it in order to be safe. 
... 
… if I would have reported him, my life wouldn’t have been worth 
living, because the only thing that the RCMP officers would have done 
would have been to come and ask him, “Did you do that?” and he 
would deny everything, paint them a pretty picture like he always does 
and then they would just leave me alone there with him and that would 
have been too dangerous to take the chance.
73
  
Ms. Doucet’s actions were also considered highly suspicious because 
the last threat Mr. Ryan had uttered was weeks in the past. This view 
ignores that reality that the violence and control the abuser has inflicted 
are not isolated, separate acts. As LEAF and CAEFS submitted to the 
Supreme Court in Ryan, “acts of coercion and control through physical, 
psychological and sexual violence … constitute an aggregate pattern of 
coercive control, intended to keep women in a state of constant dread and 
to induce compliance with the abuser’s demands”.
74
 In finding that 
Ms. Doucet reasonably apprehended mortal danger, the trial judge 
properly considered the preceding 15 years of violence and control by 
Mr. Ryan, the ongoing effects of his conduct on Ms. Doucet and the 
heightened lethal danger posed by abusive men who stalk their spouses 
following separation. The question that had to be asked is “was there 
sufficient evidence to establish … that a woman like Ms. Doucet, abused 
for years, would have acted similarly?”
75
  
The reference to “other means” in subsection 34(2)(b) will invariably 
import the notion from previous case law that there be “no other safe 
avenue” before one’s actions are deemed “morally involuntary”. This is 
an essential factor that must be considered. If there was another avenue 
or means of escape, the law should not pass moral judgment lightly. 
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Ms. Doucet, many offered, should have gone to a shelter. But as noted 
above, it is not just the degree of violence that affects how a woman 
experiences her situation and her available options — it is the extent and 
degree of the control and coercion she has been subjected to during her 
relationship.
76
 The assessment of whether conduct is “voluntary” — the 
product of “free will” and a controlled body unhindered by external 
constraints — must reflect this reality. Given the number of women 
killed in Canada by their ex-partners each year, it cannot be said that 
leaving or going to a shelter, is always a “safe avenue of escape”. The 
danger women are in when they leave their abusers should not be 
overlooked or minimized in this assessment. 
In the context of discussing “no safe avenue of escape”, I must point 
out what I see as a fundamental contradiction — and a highly 
problematic one — in how some viewed Ms. Doucet’s actions and the 
“castle doctrine” as it is understood in the context of self-defence. This 
doctrine holds that a person need not retreat from their “castle” in order 
for their actions in defending themselves to be excused. For example, a 
man like Mr. Angelis, who is almost twice the size of his wife, did not 
have to duck out the door of his apartment, only feet away, before his act 
of killing her could be seen as potentially justifiable.
77
 Not “excusable” 
— but all-out justifiable.
78
 In fact, in Ontario, under Forde and Docherty, 
a trier of fact is not even permitted to consider whether simply walking 
out the door may have been a “safe avenue of escape” and may have 
saved the victim’s life.
79
 In many cases it would be untenable to require 
that one should retreat from one’s home before being able to legitimately 
defend oneself. It is also unrealistic to think that leaving would 
necessarily ensure one’s safety. However, it should be one of many 
factors that a trier of fact should be able to consider when assessing 
whether taking another’s life was justified.  
When advancing a claim of self-defence based on the new provision, 
the defence, at least at this point, will have to call expert evidence about 
the impact on the accused of violence and coercion in order for the trier 
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to be able to assess whether their actions were “reasonable”. However, 
I cannot leave it unsaid that in many cases defences are advanced and 
accepted without any expert evidence. As Susan Chapman and Howard 
Krongold argued for the Criminal Lawyers’ Association in Ryan, to 
always require expert opinion in such cases would be akin to imposing a 
corroboration requirement on women’s evidence: 
[I]t is important to recognize that expert evidence may not always be 
necessary to demonstrate the battered spouse’s perspective. To always 
demand expert evidence in such a case is to impose a sort of 
corroboration requirement on the evidence of a woman accused of a 
crime. This is neither fair nor justified. One day it may not be necessary 
for a woman to call expert evidence to corroborate the reasonableness 
of her belief that a man who has for many years raped her, threatened 
her life and the life of her child, provided details as to his planned 
disposal of their bodies, held a gun to her head, etc. represents an 
ongoing threat to her life and the life of her child. Until then, the option 
to adduce expert evidence in order to put the accused’s perspective into 




Further, and of course, we cannot always expect women to defend 
themselves like men do, in “hand to hand combat”. Ms. Doucet was not on 
the same footing with Mr. Ryan size-wise, nor did she have the ease of 
access to guns that he had. Admittedly, there is “something” that is 
unsettling about hiring a hit man. But had she killed him herself — had her 
size or strength or access to guns allowed her to — she would have been 
able to claim self-defence. Further, as Professor Elizabeth Sheehy posits: 
[H]ow can women who are trapped by a terrifyingly violent male 
partner ensure that they save their own lives without “planning”? ... Is 
there a moral difference between spontaneous self-defence, where a 
woman happens upon a weapon at just the right moment to fend off a 
potentially murderous attack, and planned self-defence, where the 
woman tries to guarantee her own survival by preparation? With no 
other option that would demonstrably save her life, seeking aid from a 
third party may well be a woman’s last resort. Jane Hurshman tried and 
failed to hire a hit man to kill Billy Stafford. In the end she committed 
the homicide herself, but does that change the fact in either scenario she 
was acting in self-defence?
81
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Finally, not all “battered women” fit one mould, a mould some 
thought Ms. Doucet — being educated with a full-time job — did not fit. 
The comments of McLachlin and L’Heureux-Dubé JJ. in their decision in 
Malott remain instructive: 
It is possible that those women who are unable to fit themselves within 
the stereotype of a victimized, passive, helpless, dependent, battered 
woman will not have their claims to self-defence fairly decided. For 
instance, women who have demonstrated too much strength or 
initiative, women of colour, women who are professionals, or women 
who might have fought back against their abusers on previous 
occasions, should not be penalized for failing to accord with the 
stereotypical image of the archetypal battered woman. … Needless to 
say, women with these characteristics are still entitled to have their 
claims of self-defence fairly adjudicated, and they are also still entitled 
to have their experiences as battered women inform the analysis. 
Professor Grant … warns against allowing the law to develop such that 
a woman accused of killing her abuser must either have been 
“reasonable ‘like a man’ or reasonable ‘like a battered woman’”. 
I agree that this must be avoided. The “reasonable woman” must not be 
forgotten in the analysis, and deserves to be as much a part of the 
objective standard of the reasonable person as does the “reasonable 
man”. 
… The legal inquiry into the moral culpability of a woman who is, for 
instance, claiming self-defence must focus on the reasonableness of her 
actions in the context of her personal experiences, and her experiences 
as a woman, not on her status as a battered woman and her entitlement 
to claim that she is suffering from “battered woman syndrome”. … By 
emphasizing a woman’s “learned helplessness”, her dependence, her 
victimization, and her low self-esteem, in order to establish that she 
suffers from “battered woman syndrome”, the legal debate shifts from 
the objective rationality of her actions to preserve her own life to those 
personal inadequacies which apparently explain her failure to flee from 
her abuser. Such an emphasis comports too well with society’s 
stereotypes about women. Therefore, it should be scrupulously avoided 
because it only serves to undermine the important advancements 
achieved by the decision in Lavallee.
82
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Our law will always have a healthy skepticism to some defences. As 
McLachlin J. wrote in McIntosh, “[l]ife is precious; the justification for 
taking it must be defined with care and circumspection”.
83
 The new self-
defence provisions, as they may apply to situations like Ms. Doucet’s, 
must be advanced and understood in recognition of the realities of 
domestic violence and its varying impact on women’s lives and the 
“choices” they make.  
                                                                                                                                  
83  R. v. McIntosh, [1995] S.C.J. No. 16, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 686, at para. 82 (S.C.C.). 
